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THE FUTURE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT INJUNCTION AFTER OHIO V. 
KOVACS 
Catherine A. Kellett* 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, the American people face a costly and dangerous legacy 
from this century's scientific and industrial growth and develop-
ment. 1 The manufacture of complex and diverse products that has 
improved our standard of living also has created waste products that 
have been disposed of inadequately or improperly, and are now 
contaminating or threatening to contaminate the natural resources 
upon which Americans rely. 2 
The cost of cleaning up these waste sites is high.3 The federal 
hazardous waste cleanup laws,4 as well as a panoply of state laws 
* Staff Member 1984-1985, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 The Love Canal at Niagara Falls, New York, is perhaps the most publicized of the 
hazardous waste disposal sites. It provided the impetus for congressional action on the haz-
ardous waste problem. See Note, Abating an Imminent Hazard: Injunctive Relief Under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 32 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 787, 791-92 (1983). 
2 Chief among worries about abandoned hazardous waste dumps are threats to groundwater 
that serves as a drinking water supply. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Co., 546 F. 
Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1980). However, other problems exist as well. Use of the chemical dioxin 
to spray roadways contaminated the soil in and around Times Beach, Missouri, and led to the 
condemnation and purchase of the town by the United States government. See Missouri Now 
Fears 100 Sites Co'uld Be Tainted by Dioxin N. Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1983, at 1, col. 5. Airborne 
substances also create concern at certain disposal sites. In New Hampshire, asbestos particles 
from an uncovered dumpsite threatened the health of nearby residents. See United States v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20310 (D.N.H. Nov. 15, 
1982). 
3 Recent estimates from the Office of Technology Assessment suggest that in the next fifty 
years, cleanup at 10,000 sites in the U.S. could cost over $100 billion. 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 
1908-09 (Mar. 15, 1985). 
4 There are two major federal hazardous waste cleanup laws. The more recent is the 
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that govern industrial cleanup and disposal practices,5 provide that 
those parties responsible for the dangers created by improper dis-
posal are required to bear the costs of eliminating the danger they 
have caused by paying for the cleanup themselves. 6 To enforce com-
pliance with these statutory requirements, the federal and state 
governments not only seek recovery of costs that they incur in 
responding to problems, 7 but they also can seek preliminary injunc-
tions against the offending businesses. 8 Courts are asked to grant 
remedies to address the threats from hazardous waste dumpsites 
that impose the remedial costs immediately upon the responsible 
parties. 9 
As a result of bearing these high costs of cleanup activities, many 
businesses suffer financially and, in some cases, their executives 
decide to declare bankruptcy.lO The federal and state governments 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 
U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. v 1981). CERCLA, also know as the "Superfund" law for its § 9631 
Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund, was passed specifically to deal with the problems 
posed by past disposal practices such as abandoned waste dumps. See U.S. v. Wade, 546 F. 
Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Hazardous waste is also regulated through the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. v 
1981), RCRA provides a "cradle-to-grave" system of tracking hazardous waste and its disposal, 
including licensing and monitoring of hazardous waste facilities. See Goldfarb, The Hazards 
of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 249, 253 (1979). 
5 Many states have enacted their own Superfund laws. See, e.g., Massachusetts Oil & 
Hazardous Waste Release Prevention Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E §§ 1-13 (Law Co-op. 
Supp. 1985). See also Comment, State Hazardous Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict 
or Complement?, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10348 (Nov. 1983). Other state laws 
address related hazardous substance release and waste disposal problems. For example, Ohio's 
Water Pollution Control Law, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 611 (Baldwin 1982), forbids the 
discharge of toxic pollutants into the waters of the state. 
6 For example, CERCLA provides that parties involved in the creation, transport and 
ultimate disposal of the waste are liable fur the cost of cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. v 
1981). 
7 Cost recovery under CERCLA is provided in its liability section, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. 
v 1981), that allows the government to recover costs incurred in a federal cleanup effort 
authorized under the response authority. Id. § 9607(a). States and municipalities who clean 
up sites may also maintain actions under CERCLA against responsible parties. See id. §§ 9607, 
9611; see also City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
R In CERCLA, the EPA is authorized to seek necessary relief and may issue orders when 
there may be an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to public health, welfare or the 
environment from the release of a hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
The Act also specifically authorized the court to grant equitable relief. Id. See infra note 24 
and accompanying text. 
9 Injunctive remedies are used regularly in the federal environmental enforcement scheme. 
See Comment, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liability, 14 
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10224, 10225 (June 1984); Note, The Role of Injunctive 
Relief and Settlements in Superfund Enforcement, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 706, 711 (1983). 
10 Bankruptcy is not an unanticipated result of allocating cieanup costs to businesses. The 
federal government anticipated that at certain waste sites, parties responsible for the cleanup 
of the waste would be either missing or bankrupt. The federal government has administered 
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then must attempt to enforce environmental regulations, and judg-
ments obtained under them, against bankrupt parties. 11 The bank-
ruptcy laws serve a legitimate purpose to shelter and give relief to 
financially troubled businesses and individuals. However, because 
bankruptcy permits a party to free himself from past debts, including 
debts to the government, it is feared that bankruptcy may become 
a haven for environmental violators, thus vitiating the ability of 
government to deter violations. 12 The federal and state governments 
therefore have proceeded to impose and enforce judgments, specif-
ically injunctions, against debtors, pursuant to express authority in 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 13 They are attempting to assure 
when public health and safety are at issue that the debtors ultimately 
cannot escape their obligations to the government and its citizens. 
Governmental attempts to enforce environmental laws against 
debtors have given rise to a controversy that stems from the irrec-
oncilability of two governmental goals. The federal Bankruptcy Act 
is designed to rationalize the bankruptcy process, in part through 
its provisions that shelter and give relief to debtors. 14 Environmental 
laws are designed to protect citizens, in part by assuring that those 
who are responsible for dangerous conditions are held accountable 
for seeing that those conditions are ameliorated. 15 Thus, a debtor 
who is responsible for costly environmental conditions can only be 
the federal Superfund law to preserve its limited resources for those situations where no 
responsible party is available to pay the cleanup costs. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6119,6125. 
11 See, e.g., In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982) (action by the state of Ohio against 
debtor); United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 
20310 (D.N.H. Nov. 14, 1982) (federal CERCLA action against debtor). 
12 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Ohio v. 
Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the United States]. For background 
and discussion of the Kovacs case, see infra notes 153-72 and 210-68 and accompanying text. 
In addition to the United States, thirty states submitted or joined in amicus briefs in support 
of the state of Ohio. Bankruptcy Held a Polluter Shield, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1985, I, at 17, 
col. 1. 
13 Pub. L. No. 95-598 § 101,92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. 
(Supp. v 1984)). 
14 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6297 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. In this case, Congress was 
describing the automatic stay provision for bankruptcy relief, discussed infra at notes 70-112 
and accompanying text. 
15 For instance, the goals of CERCLA have been summarized this way: 
First, Congress intended that the federal government be immediately given the tools 
necessary for a prompt and effective response to problems of national magnitude 
resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, Congress intended that those re-
sponsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and 
responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created. 
Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 1112. 
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given relief under the Bankruptcy Act at the expense of the goal of 
strict environmental accountability. The crux of the problem lies not 
so much in determining who will pay, but rather in deciding what 
sorts of debts to society we intend to excuse through the operation 
and availability of the bankruptcy laws. 
This article examines the clash between environmental enforce-
ment and the bankruptcy laws that arises when governments at-
tempt to enforce environmental injunctions against parties in bank-
ruptcy. Section I discusses environmental injunctions and their use 
in state and federal enforcement actions. 16 Section II discusses the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act and its automatic stay17 and discharge1S 
provisions. 19 This section concludes that, through the statutory ex-
ceptions to the automatic stay provision, Congress intended to give 
governments wide latitude in enforcing both their environmental 
laws, and the injunctive remedies that result. Section II also con-
cludes that although Congress did not clearly exempt injunctive 
judgments from the ultimate relief of discharge, the language of the 
Act permits courts to find that when bankruptcy proceedings are 
concluded, a party should continue to bear responsibility for the 
costs of cleaning up hazardous wastes and other dangerous pollu-
tants. Section III examines recent case law on the applicability of 
both the automatic stay and the discharge provision to the enforce-
ment of environmental injunctions. 20 The article concludes that, if 
the federal and state governments want to ensure that the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code do not shelter polluters, they must treat 
those polluters like criminals. 
I. ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT INJUNCTIONS 
The injunction is a judicial order to a party requiring them to take, 
or to refrain from taking, certain actions. 21 It is an unusual remedy, 
and is reserved for situations when no other adequate legal remedies 
exist. 22 Both mandatory injunctions (requiring action) and prohibi-
16 See infra 21-41 and accompanying text. 
17 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. II 1984). 
18 [d. § 727. 
19 See infra notes 42-147 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 148-268 and accompanying text. 
21 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2941 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLERJ. 
22 [d. § 2942. A remedy is adequate when it gives full relief to a party. Legal remedies 
include money damages, which would be adequate if they compensated a party for losses 
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tory injunctions (restraining action) may be issued prior to a trial on 
the merits; these "preliminary injunctions" are used when the action 
or restraint of action is required to prevent an irreparable injury 
from occurring.23 Injunctive relief is available both under statutory 
provisions,24 and as part of courts' common law "equitable jurisdic-
tion. "25 Injunctions are frequently a proper remedy for the protection 
of the rights or welfare of the public, and are particularly appropriate 
in environmental enforcement in order to "protect a large public 
from the rippling and impalpable effects of violations" of environ-
mental laws. 26 
States and the federal government use injunctions and other eq-
uitable remedies to aid them in enforcing their environmental laws. 27 
In environmental regulatory laws enacted between 1967 and 1980, 
Congress granted to federal officials the authority to seek equitable 
relief, including injunctions, in cases of "imminent and substantial 
endangerment" to persons or the environment. 28 States seeking in-
junctions rely primarily on the equity power of their courts to aid 
sustained. Remedies are inadequate if: (1) a money award is speculative because damages are 
uncertain; (2) injuries will continue; (3) damages are not adequate to compensate; and (4) 
irreparable harm will occur (generally to the plaintiff) without the injunction and for which 
harm money damages will not compensate. Id. § 2944. 
23 Id. § 2948. 
24 See, e.g., the abatement authority of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). This section 
permits the federal government to seek necessary relief from a district court, which in turn 
is empowered specifically to grant "such relief as the public interest and the equities of the 
case may require." Id. Actions under this section have included suits seeking preliminary 
injunctions to force cleanups. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and 
Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984). 
25 Modern courts possess merged powers of law and equity, but certain powers of a court, 
such as the power to issue and enforce injunctions, are considered part of the equity power 
of the court, which enables the court to "do justice" when the law and other legal remedies 
fail to do so. See Winner, The Chancellor's Foot and Environmental Law: A Call for Better 
Reasoned Decisions on Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENVTL. L. 477, 479-84 (1979). 
26 Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 562 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Preliminary Injunctions]. 
Z7 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (U.S. sought preliminary 
injunction under CERCLA and RCRA provisions). 
28 Imminent hazard provisions appear at section 1431 of the Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 300i(a) (1976); section 504(A) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (Supp. 
v 1981); section 303 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (Supp. v 1981); section 7003 of 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976); section 8 of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606(b) (1982); and section 106 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
One commentator suggests that the equitable power granted by these statutes might extend 
to allow courts to use remedies such as environmental restoration orders. Note, Environ-
mental Restoration Orders, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 171, 197-203 (1985). 
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them in enforcement of their environmental laws when public health 
or the environment may be threatened. 29 
Environmental law enforcers have made particular use of the 
mandatory preliminary injunction to require parties to clean up haz-
ardous substances and pollution. Traditionally, the mandatory in-
junction was viewed as an "extraordinary" remedy because the court 
imposed a duty of its own making, and as a result, became part of 
the enforcement process. 30 However, the use of mandatory prelimi-
nary injunctions is now considered appropriate when active pollution 
conditions, "if allowed to continue or proceed unchecked and unre-
strained, will inflict serious irreparable injury. "31 Improper disposal 
of hazardous waste presents just such a threat in many cases; for 
instance, hazardous chemicals dumped on the ground, if not cleared 
up, may leach through soil and into groundwater supplies, or may 
drain into streams and lakes. The presence of such threats explains 
why government actions to seek such injunctions have in some cases 
been favorably received by courts. 32 
A mandatory injunction often requires the expenditure of money 
or resources by a defendant because it imposes on them an affir-
mative duty to perform certain acts. Injunctions to clean up pollution 
that presents a potential health risk represents a responsibility that 
the state or federal government will generally assume if the respon-
sible party fails or is unable to assume it. 33 The injunction thus 
allocates cleanup costs from the government to the legally respon-
sible parties. 
29 See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267,275 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(injunction sought to secure cleanup of mining sites threatening water resources). 
30 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, at § 2942. Authorities who have studied the supposed 
reluctance of courts to issue mandatory injunctions, however, note that the courts have used 
them "whenever the circumstances warrant[ed]." Id. The rule against mandatory injunctions 
is criticized as a formulaic way to avoid a decision on the merits of a preliminary injunction, 
namely relative burdens on the parties. See Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 994, 1063 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. 
31 United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982). 
32 See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). 
33 The governmental obligation arises under laws such as CERCLA and state "Superfund" 
laws. See supra note 5. CERCLA also permits the EPA to issue administrative orders to 
parties who are "potentially liable" for cleanup at hazardous waste sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 
(Supp. V 1981). EPA may seek injunctions to enforce the orders, and also is authorized to 
assess penalties against parties who refuse to comply. Id. § 9607(c). However, the EPA's 
ability to assess such penalties prior to a hearing was successfully challenged by a potentially 
responsible party. See Aminoil Inc. v. EPA, 21 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1817 (C.D. Cal., 
Sept. 28, 1984). 
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When a government seeks a preliminary injunction in the case of 
an alleged or proved violation of environmental laws it must convince 
the court that the interests served by the issuance of the injunction, 
such as the protection of a water supply or of the health of nearby 
residents, outweigh the interests of the party against whom the 
injunction is sought. In issuing a preliminary injunction, courts look 
at four factors to balance the interests involved: 
(1) the probability of irreparable injury to the moving party in 
the absence of relief; (2) the possibility of harm to the non-moving 
party if relief is granted; (3) the likelihood of success on the 
merits; and (4) the public interest. 34 
When preliminary injunctive relief is sought under statutory au-
thority, courts do not always require a showing of irreparable in-
jury.35 Once an injunction has been imposed, failure to comply can 
be punished by an action for contempt of court. 36 Alternatively, if a 
party fails to comply with a mandatory injunction, the court may 
impose a receivership to force the party to comply.37 Where receiv-
erships are imposed to enforce an injunction, the court appoints a 
third party receiver to take over the property or assets of the party 
who has failed to comply with the injunction and to manage those 
assets until compliance is reached. 38 The receivership, like the un-
derlying injunction, is equitable in nature, and in some cases receiv-
34 u.s. v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Goldhaber v. Foley, 519 F. Supp. 
466, 473 (E.D. Pa. 1981». 
35 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, at § 2948. One commentator criticizes this approach, 
on the grounds that it creates an irrebuttable presumption of irreparable injury when such 
injury may not actually be present. He would require the balancing of the factors in the case 
of all injunctions. See Preliminary Injunctions, supra note 26, at 561-62. The federal envi-
ronmental enforcement laws have created a new standard for the issuance of injunctions and 
other equitable relief; such remedies are permitted when there may be an "imminent and 
substantial endangerment" to the public health or the environment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). This standard has been interpreted as "more lenient than the 
traditional requirement of threatened irreparable harm." Price, 688 F.2d at 211. 
36 Contempt is an act of disobedience or disrespect to a judicial body. Note, Contempt and 
the Automat'ic Stay, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 177, 179 (1984). Courts distinguish between civil 
and criminal contempt. Criminal contempt vindicates the court's authority, while civil contempt 
proceedings are used to compel obedience to the court's order or to get some substitute relief 
for the benefit of the opposing party. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. 
REV. 183, 235 (1971). 
37 Receiverships have been used to enforce injunctions in cases where the injunction involved 
property. Developments, supra note 30, at 1092. 
36 See United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512, 520 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
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erships are considered to be equivalent to mandatory injunctions. 39 
The receivership is the remedy of last resort, only used when all 
other remedies, including injunctions, have been tried. 40 Receiver-
ships are appropriate tools in the enforcement of environmental laws 
"particularly in aid of an outstanding injunction" when "[t]he more 
usual remedies - contempt proceedings and further injunctions -
[are] plainly not very promising as they [invite] further confrontation 
and delay. "41 
In light of the automatic stay and discharge provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act, which govern the conduct of legal action and the 
ultimate status of legal obligations imposed against parties who de-
clare bankruptcy, the use of injunctions and, when necessary, re-
ceiverships, to enforce environmental laws against bankrupt parties 
is controversial. This controversy has given rise to litigation that 
has produced conflicting interpretations of the propriety of such 
governmental enforcement. To better understand this controversy, 
the following section examines the applicable provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act42 was enacted in 1978. The Act, 
commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) repre-
sented the first overhaul of the federal bankruptcy system in over 
forty years: it revised both the substantive law of bankruptcy,43 and 
39 I. CLARK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS, § 58 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 
RECEIVERS]; see also Note, Receivership as a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, 24 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 115, 132-42 (1969). 
40 RECEIVERS, supra note 39, at § 59; see Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 456 (N.D. 
Cal. 1978). 
41 City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. at 520 (quoting Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 
(1st Cir. 1976». See also Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985) (state of Ohio obtained 
appointment of receiver to assure compliance with environmental laws). See infra notes 153-
72 and 210-68 and accompanying text. 
42 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified 
at 11 U.S.C., in scattered sections of28 U.S.C. and in scattered sections of other titles (1982)). 
43 Changes in the substantive law are codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The bankruptcy 
law is divided into eight chapters, three of which set forth definitions common to all bank-
ruptcies: Chapter 1: General Provisions, id. §§ 101-109; Chapter 3: Case Administration, id. 
§§ 301--366; and Chapter 5: Creditors, The Debtor and The Estate, id. §§ 501-556. The Act 
also includes Chapter 13, which allows individuals not in a business to restructure and payoff 
most debts. Id. §§ 1301-1330. 
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the bankruptcy court system,44 in an attempt to respond to the 
growing number of bankruptcies. 45 
Individuals and businesses who are subject to environmental en-
forcement laws and who incur debts that exceed their capacity to 
pay may be involved in one of two types of bankruptcy proceeding: 
liquidation46 or reorganization. 47 When an individual or business 
debtor files for a Chapter 748 liquidation, or "straight," bankruptcy, 
a trustee is appointed by the bankruptcy court to administer the 
debtor's assets, which are known as the estate. The trustee liqui-
dates the debtor's non-exempt49 assets and distributes them to the 
creditors of the debtor. 50 Upon completion of liquidation, a debtor is 
44 Changes in the bankruptcy court system are codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. 
(1982 & Supp. I 1984). The broad grant of jurisdiction to the newly structured bankruptcy 
courts was brought into question in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 
458 U.S. 50 (1982), in which the Court found that the jurisdictional grant violated the United 
States Constitution. See Casenote, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline 
Co.: The Broad Jurisdiction Granted to the Bankruptcy Courts by the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 is Invalidated, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 317 (1983). 
45 The Bankruptcy Reform Act repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 
and was enacted to modernize bankruptcy law. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. 
The most recent revision of the bankruptcy law had occurred in 1938; since that time vast 
changes including "steady growth in the number of bankruptcies, both consumer and ... 
business reorganization[s] ... [had] led to great stresses and strains in the bankruptcy 
system." Id. at 5788-89. A study commission was appointed in 1970, which filed its final report 
including a draft bill in 1973. Hearings commenced in 1975. Id. at 5787-88. 
The passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act is detailed in two articles by participants in the 
process. See Butler, A Congressman's Reflections on the Drafting of the Bankruptcy Code of 
1978, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557 (1980); Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy 
Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 941 (1979). 
46 Statutory provisions regarding liquidations appear in Chapter 7 of the Code, 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 701-766 (1982). For a detailed explanation of the liquidation provisions, see Rendleman, 
Liquidation Bankruptcy Under the '78 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 575 (1980); Aaron, 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employmentjor-Lawyers Bill-Part III: Busi-
ness Bankruptcy, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 405. 
47 Reorganization is detailed in Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982). Perhaps the 
most important accomplishment of the 1978 Code was the consolidation of the three reorga-
nization chapters (formerly X, XI and XII) into a single Chapter 11. SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 45, at 9, reprinted at 5795. See Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full 
Employment for Lawyers Bill-Part I: Overview and Legislative History, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 
1, 16-17. 
48 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(3), 701, 702 (1982). 
49 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982). Exempt assets include those items the individual debtor needs 
for the "fresh start." See SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, reprinted at 5793. None of the 
property of business debtors can be claimed as exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982). 
50 Only parties who have allowable "claims" may seek to share in distribution of assets. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 502(aHb) and 726(a) (1982). Distribution is made according to priority system. Id. 
§ 726. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. 
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granted a discharge, 51 or forgiveness, of debts, despite the fact that 
the creditors may not have received complete payment out of the 
liquidation proceeds. 52 However, discharge is not available to all 
debtors, 53 and certain debts are exempted from discharge by the 
statute. 54 
By contrast, the reorganization option of Chapter 11,55 is used 
primarily by corporate business debtors who usually act as their own 
trustee. The purpose of a reorganization is to restructure the busi-
ness's debt so that it may continue to operate. 56 Reorganization 
proceeds according to a reorganization plan, formulated by the 
debtor and its creditors, 57 and a discharge of obligations follows 
affirmation of the plan by the court. 58 
Both the reorganization and liquidation sections of the Code pro-
vide a system of priorities for the payment (in liquidation) or restruc-
turing (in reorganization) of debt out of the limited assets of the 
debtor's estate. For example, in liquidations, secured debts59 are 
honored first, and then administrative expenses,60 and then other 
priority claims. 61 Generally, unsecured creditors,62 a classification 
51 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982). 
52Id. § 727(b). 
53 Id. § 727(a). See infra notes 120-29 and accompanying text. Corporate debtors are denied 
Chapter 7 discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(l) (1982). The legislative history suggests that this 
denial of discharge is to discourage parties from trafficking in corporate shells, a form of 
bankruptcy fraud. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 7, reprinted at 5793. However, 
some courts have opined that this exemption is merely the recognition that the discharge of 
a corporate debtor is a meaningless gesture, since with the distribution of the corporation, in 
liquidation, no party remains to satisfy debts. See, e.g., In re Thomas Solvent Co., 44 Bankr. 
83, 86 (Bankr. W.D, Mich. 1984); see also Hennigan, Accommodating Regulatory Enforcement 
and Bankruptcy Protection, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1,6 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy 
Protection]. 
54 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1982). 
55 In these cases, the business becomes a debtor-in-possession and continues to operate 
whenever and to whatever extent possible. Id. § 107. This was done by the Manville Corpo-
ration in the controversial Johns-Manville bankruptcy. See Comment, Environmental Protec-
tion and Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Toward a Better Compromise, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671, 
673-87 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Protection]. 
56 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 220, reprinted at 6179. 
57 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129 (1982). 
58 Id. §§ 1122-1123, 1141. Most of the controversies that have so far arisen in the enforce-
ment of environmental laws against debtors concern liquidation bankruptcies. It is beyond the 
scope of this comment to address the numerous issues raised in the reorganization context. 
For a treatment of some of these issues, see Environmental Protection, supra note 55. 
59 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 725 (1982). 
60 Id. § 507(a)(1). Some governments have sought to recover debts from environmental 
violators by claiming they are administrative expenses. See Drabkin, Moorman, & Kirsch, 
Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste: Caveat Creditor, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 10168, 10177-79 (June 1985) [hereinafter cited as Caveat Creditor]. 
61 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1982). 
62 Id. § 726(a), (b). 
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which includes government claims, stand at the end of the line. 63 
Since there is no assurance that even priority creditors will be 
satisfied out of the debtor's limited estate, it is unlikely that govern-
ment claims, such as those for environmental cleanup expenditures 
incurred by government and for which the debtor is liable, will be 
satisfied. 
State governments can improve their chances for satisfaction of 
claims in the priority system by classifying certain debts owed to 
them as first priority claims, a classification that the bankruptcy 
court, in theory, will honor.64 Three states have enacted laws to 
create such a priority for environmental cleanup claims;65 however, 
the other states have not, so the great bulk of environmental cleanup 
debts will continue to occupy a low priority slot and thus will rarely 
be satisfied. 66 
The filing of any bankruptcy petition67 triggers the automatic stay 
provision of the Code68 so that all actions or proceedings against the 
debtor, including most legal proceedings and collection actions, are 
immediately halted. 69 The next section of this article examines the 
automatic stay provision, its legislative history, and a related code 
provision in light of the controversy over enforcing injunctions 
against parties in bankruptcy. 
A. The Automatic Stay Provision: Section 362 
First codified in the 1978 Act,70 the stay offers protection for both 
debtor and creditors,71 as well as an aid to the administration of the 
63 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 193, reprinted at 6154. The U.S. government 
does enjoy a priority for federal income tax claims, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1982), and there are 
other government-related exceptions to discharge. [d. § 523; see infra text and notes at notes 
131-35. 
64 State law determines the property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate. Butner v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979); see Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). 
65 The states have created such priority for their environmental claims by imposing a lien 
status on them. See Caveat Cred,:tor, supra note 60, at 179-80. As these commentators point 
out, these laws raise problems of notice and fairness to other creditors. A member of Congress 
unsuccessfully sought to impose a similar lien status on CERCLA claims. See Lockett, En-
vironmental Liability Enforcement and the Bankruptcy Act of 1978: A Study of R.R. 2767, 
the "Superlien" Provision, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 859 (1984). 
66 See supra note 10. 
67 Bankruptcy petitions may be either voluntarily filed by debtors, 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), 
or filed by creditors, id. § 303. 
68 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). 
69 [d. §§ 362(a)(l)-(8). 
70 Under prior law, the stay provisions were judicially developed, and codified in a piecemeal 
fashion in the Bankruptcy Procedural Rules. The stay provision is currently codified in Title 
3, the "Administrative Powers" section o~. the Act. For a detailed study of the stay provision 
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bankruptcy by the court and the bankruptcy trustees. The stay is a 
fundamental debtor protection because it provides a "breathing 
spell" for the debtor from creditor harassment and relieves the 
concerns that caused the bankruptcy.72 The stay also protects the 
interests of creditors by staying collection activities so that the 
interests of all creditors are protected against the predatory actions 
of a few. 73 
The stay automatically goes into effect when the debtor's bank-
ruptcy petition is filed. 74 The stay is applicable to "all entities," 
including governmental units,75 who initiate legal proceedings or 
collection efforts on the basis of the debtor's pre-filing activity.76 The 
filing of the petition, however, does not stay all proceedings. 77 In 
particular, government enforcement of regulatory laws, such as en-
vironmental protection laws, is specifically permitted to proceed 
under two interrelated exceptions to the automatic stay. The stay 
normally operates to stop judicial, administrative or other proceed-
ings against the debtor that were or could have been commenced 
before the filing.78 Section 362(b)(4), however, excepts "an action or 
proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental 
unit's police or regulatory power."79 Section 362(b)(5) excepts "en-
forcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in 
an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such 
governmental unit's police or regulatory power" from the otherwise 
applicable stay of the enforcement80 against the debtor or his prop-
under the old and new bankruptcy laws, see Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 
11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 175 (1978); Kennedy, Automatic Stays under the New Bankruptcy 
Laws, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Automatic Stay Il]. 
71 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 340, reprinted at 6296-97. 
7'.lId. 
73 Id., reprinted at 6297. 
7411 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). 
75Id. § 362(a), which states that "this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities 
.... " The entities include governmental units. Id. § 101(14). The legislative history also 
clarifies this point: 
[w]ith respect to ... the application of the automatic stay, to governmental actions, 
this section ... [is] intended to be an express waiver of sovereign immunity of the 
Federal government, and an assertion of the bankruptcy power over State govern-
ments under the Supremacy Clause notwithstanding a State's sovereign immunity. 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 51, reprinted at 6299. 
76 The stay provision lists eight categories of proceedings or actions to which it applies. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1)-(8) (1982). 
77 The exceptions to the automatic stay are listed in 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(1)-(8) (1982). 
78 I d. § 362(a)(1). 
79Id. § 362(b)(4). 
80 I d. § 362(a)(1). 
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erty of judgments obtained before filing. 81 Thus, section 362(b)(4) is 
directed at civil actions82 that have been or could be commenced 
against a debtor, while section 362(b)(5) is directed at judgments or 
outstanding final orders entered against a debtor in proceedings that 
have concluded before the bankruptcy petition was filed. These two 
exceptions are generally read and interpreted together83 to consti-
tute the "government enforcement exceptions." The exceptions in-
dicate a legislative intent that the stay was not to act as an impe-
diment to law enforcement actions. 84 The legislative history of the 
Act supports this conclusion by illuminating Congress' purpose in 
providing these exceptions, and shows why section 105 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, which defines the powers of the court, helps to clarify 
the scope and purpose of the stay provision and its exceptions. The 
following sections examine the legislative history of both the auto-
matic stay exceptions and of section 105. 
l. Legislative History of the Exceptions to the Automatic Stay 
Provision 
The legislative history of the automatic stay exceptions supports 
a conclusion that Congress intended that governmental actions to 
enforce environmental regulations, especially those protecting the 
public health and safety, were to proceed unimpeded under these 
exceptions. 85 In early hearings regarding the proposed Bankruptcy 
81Id. § 362(a)(2). This section of the stay halts the enforcement of judgments obtained 
before the bankruptcy filing and does not mention judgments that might be obtained after the 
filing. One commentator has concluded that Congress intended that section 362(a)(2) be con-
sistent with section 362(a)(1), which stays all actions that were or could have been commenced 
before filing, and that thus section 362(a)(2) would apply to any judgments that result from 
pre-petition causes of action. Automatic Stay II, supra note 70, at 14. At least one court has 
disagreed with this conclusion. See Department of Envtl. Resources v. Peggs Run Coal Co., 
423 A.2d 765, 767 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980). 
82 Criminal actions are not stayed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982). 
83 In comments on the interpretation to be given to the relationship between sections 
362(b)(4) and 362(b)(5), Professor Kennedy reads the sections together, as "render[ing] the 
automatic stay inoperative against any governmental unit enforcing its police or regulatory 
power otherwise than by collecting a money judgment." Automatic Stay II, supra note 70, 
at 27. Professor Aaron interprets § 362(b)(5) as limiting enforcement of governmental agency 
judgments to those "which do not involve money recovery." Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays of 
Environmental Regulation: Harvest of Commercial Timber as an Introduction to a Clash of 
Policies, 12 ENVTL. L. 1, 8 (1981). 
84 This conclusion is reinforced by the first exception to the stay, which excepts the contin-
uation or commencement of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(b)(1) (1982). 
85 Legislative intent as revealed through congressional reports and the Congressional Rec-
ord is an important element in the development, application and interpretation of many federal 
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Act, the House Judiciary Committee expressed concern with prior 
"overuse" of the stay "in the area of governmental regulation. "86 The 
committee's report cited one bankruptcy court action under the pred-
ecessor to the present stay provision in which a bankruptcy court 
prevented a state from closing a debtor's plant that was illegally 
polluting a river.87 The committee report states that the new bill 
"excepts [this] kind[s] of action[s] from the automatic stay. "88 
A later section of the same House Report89 reaffirms this congres-
sional concern that the stay not hamper enforcement of environmen-
tal regulatory laws. Discussing the section 362(b)(4) exception that 
allows police or regulatory enforcement actions to continue, the 
report states that among the police and regulatory actions that may 
proceed despite the stay are suits "to prevent or stop violation of 
... environmental protection ... laws" and suits "attempting to fix 
damages for violation of such law[s]."9o 
This report also gives explicit support for the entry and enforce-
ment of injunctive remedies. It states that section 362(b)(5), which 
permits enforcement of all pre-filing judgments except money judg-
ments, "makes clear that the [governmental] exception extends to 
permit an injunction and the enforcement of an injunction .... "91 
In addition, the floor statements by the House and Senate man-
agers of the bill that are the final statement of the congressional 
statutes. See Note, The Congressional Record and the First Amendment: Accuracy is the 
Best Policy, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 341, 342 (1985). 
86 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, reprinted at 6135. 
87/d. 
88 I d. One commentator finds in the congressional reports a clear legislative intent to permit 
the stay exceptions of §§ 362(b)(4) and (5) to "overrule decisions applying the automatic stay 
to proceedings to enforce state environmental control laws." Automatic Stay II, supra note 
70, at II. 
89 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, reprinted at 6299. 
90 Id. Identical language appears in the SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, reprinted at 5840. 
The reports also state that actions arising from laws regarding fraud, ... consumer protection, 
safety, or "similar police or regulatory laws" were not to be stayed automatically. Id. 
91 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, reprinted at 6299; SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, 
reprinted at 5838. Some commentators have interpreted this congressional language and the 
language of § 362(b)(5) as permitting governments to enforce only injunctions of the ongoing 
practices of a debtor, but not injunctions that were entered for pre-petition actions. See 
Bankruptcy Protection, supra note 53, at 21-23; see also Baird & Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic 
Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1199, 1199-1200, n.3 (1984). Neither the statute 
nor the legislative history differentiates among the various kinds of injunctions as to which 
are enforceable. Congress was no doubt aware of the costly effect of injunctions such as those 
available in environmental legislation it had passed. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976) (RCRA 
injunctive remedy section). 
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interpretation of the statutory language,92 indicate that the auto-
matic stay was not intended to prevent enforcement against debtors 
of environmental regulations. These statements assert that the sec-
tion 362(b)(4) exception for governmental enforcement actions 
against the debtor should be construed "to permit governmental 
units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety .... "93 
These legislative statements, read together with the plain lan-
guage of the sections 362(b)(4) and (b)(5) exceptions to the stay 
provision, indicate that Congress intended that environmental reg-
ulations designed to protect public health and safety be enforceable 
against a debtor in bankruptcy, both through the continuation, or 
the commencement of legal proceedings, as well as through enforce-
ment of injunctive remedies. 
Although congressional intent to permit enforcement in spite of 
the stay is clear, Congress also expressed a desire to limit this 
enforcement authority in some cases. In particular, Congress was 
concerned that governmental units might gain a favored position as 
creditors while acting under the umbrella of their enforcement pow-
ers. The most cogent expression of this concern is the statutory 
provision in the section 362(b)(5) exception that enforcement of 
money judgments will be subject to the automatic stay provision. 
The legislative report specifically states that section 362(b)(5): 
extends to permit an injunction and the enforcement of an in-
junction, and to permit the entry of a money judgment, but does 
not extend to permit enforcement of a money judgment. Since 
the assets of the debtor are in the possession and control of the 
bankruptcy court, and since they constitute a fund out of which 
all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a governmen-
tal unit of a money judgment would give it preferential treatment 
to the detriment of all other creditors. 94 
Congress extended this prohibition against predatory creditor ac-
tions by limiting the section 362(b)(4) exception. The floor statements 
that expressed support for actions to protect health and safety also 
92 124 CONGo REC. H. 1l,089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 5787, 6436 (statement of Rep. Edwards) [hereinafter cited as FLOOR STATE-
MENTS]. The identical statement of the Senate manager of the bill is found at 124 CONGo REC. 
517,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6513 
(statement of Sen. DiConcini). 
9" FLOOR STATEMENTS, supra note 92, at 6444-6445. 
94 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, reprinted at 6299. 
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urge a narrow construction of section 362(b)(4), which is the provi-
sion exempting proceedings to enforce police or regulatory laws from 
the automatic stay provision. These statements assert that the sec-
tion 362(b)(4) exception should not apply to actions that "protect a 
pecuniary interest in the property of a debtor. "95 
Thus, governmental units enjoy a broad exception from the stay 
provision to protect their citizens through enforcement actions, but, 
like other creditors, are prohibited under section 362(b)(5) from 
pursuing the collection of money judgments. However, while Con-
gress clearly intended to prohibit enforcement of money judgments, 
it clearly permitted the entry of money judgments, and both the 
entry and enforcement of injunctions,96 even in the face of the pos-
sibility of harm to other creditors. 
An interpretation dispute regarding the scope of the stay excep-
tions as set forth in the act, and as illuminated by the relevant 
legislative history, arises when a governmental enforcement action, 
legitimately pursued against a debtor to protect public health and 
safety, imposes a cost on the debtor. The controversy arises in cases 
involving actions to enforce costly judgments.97 Actions to enforce 
money judgments, such as compensatory damages claims, clearly fall 
within the limitation placed in the section 362(b)(5) exception, and 
thus an action to enforce that judgment ordinarily would be stayed. 
An environmental injunction prohibiting the debtor from continuing 
an action, or imposing upon him a mandatory duty to perform a 
cleanup, could impose a cost or loss of profits equal to the money 
paid out in compensatory damages. Yet, the statutory language of 
the exception allows both the entry and the enforcement of injunctive 
remedies, and the legislative history supports this straightforward 
conclusion. Therefore, such an injunction appears to be enforceable 
under the stay exception of section 362(b)(5). 
Additional relevant language in the legislative history supports 
this reading. It suggests that because the bankruptcy court has 
power to halt all actions, including those excepted from the automatic 
stay, to serve the goals of the bankruptcy laws when necessary, the 
exceptions to the stay should be broadly construed. That power is 
granted in section 105 of the Act, which is discussed in the following 
section. 
95 FLOOR STATEMENTS, supra note 92. 
96 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
97 For discussion of some of the cases involved in the controversy, see infra notes 148-?68 
and accompanying text. 
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2. Section 105: Clarifying the Scope of the Automatic Stay. 
Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Act98 allows the Bankruptcy Court 
to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or ap-
propriate to carry out the provisions of the title. "99 These residual 
powers of the Bankruptcy Court serve to underscore the full range 
of actions that a bankruptcy court may take to make the bankruptcy 
process go more smoothly. While this section is not linked to the 
automatic stay, the legislative history of the Code reveals that the 
automatic stay provision and its exceptions must be read in con-
junction with section 105 to understand what protection is available 
to the debtor after the bankruptcy petition is filed. 100 
The House and Senate Reports indicate that section 105 of the 
Act strengthens the debtor and creditor protections of the automatic 
stay provision by providing the district court or bankruptcy court in 
which a proceeding has been brought "ample other powers to stay 
actions not covered by the automatic stay" through its possession of 
"all the traditional injunctive powers of a court of equity. "101 The 
reports make clear that, included among those powers, is the power 
to stay actions "enumerated in the exceptions [to the stay provi-
sions], that generally should not be stayed automatically upon the 
commencement of the case, for reasons of policy or practicality. "102 
This language indicates that section 105 permits the Bankruptcy 
Court to override the effect of the statutorily-provided exceptions 
and to impose a stay of its own. However, because those exceptions 
represent policy decisions by the legislature, they should be over-
ridden only in exceptional circumstances. The legislative history 
underscores this point by making clear that a court's ability to stay 
such actions depends on a "case-by-case [determination] whether a 
partiCUlar action which may be harming the estate should be 
stayed. "103 The reports state that a stay or an injunction issued under 
section 105: 
will not be automatic upon the commencement of the case, but 
will be granted or issued under the usual rules for the issuance 
of injunctions. By excepting an act or action from the automatic 
stay, the [Act] simply requires that the trustee move the court 
98 11 U. s. c. § 105 (1982). 
99 I d. § 105(a). 
100 SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 51, reprinted at 5837; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 
14, at 342, reprinted at 6298. 
101 SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 51; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 342. 
102 SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 51; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 342. 
103 SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 51; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 342. 
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into action, rather than requiring the stayed party to request 
relief from the stay.104 
Congress thus indicated that when an action, such as the enforce-
ment of an environmental injunction, is excepted from the automatic 
stay, the trustee who has taken over the debtor's assets has the 
burden of convincing the court that the action should not go for-
ward. l05 If actions require expenditure of money from the debtor's 
estate, then the the debtor's trustee must petition the court to enjoin 
the government from their enforcement. The court evaluates the 
propriety of allowing the action to go forward under the rules, or 
for issuing any preliminary injunction. 106 To meet the burden of 
demonstrating the need for a preliminary injunction against the 
government, the trustee must prove: 1) that the estate would suffer 
irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted;107 2) that on bal-
ance, the injuries to the estate will be greater than the injury to the 
government if the injunction is not granted; 3) that the debtor has 
a high probability of succeeding on the merits in his dispute with 
the government; and, 4) that the relief granted is not contrary to 
the public interest.108 This is a far greater task than the mere filing 
of a petition that triggers the automatic stay. 
Section 105 adds to the debtor protections of the Act by supple-
menting the stay provision. However, as the legislative history il-
lustrates, this extra protection also allows courts to read the stay's 
exceptions broadly and inclusively. Section 105 thus permits enforce-
ment actions to proceed under the exceptions to the stay provision 
because it grants the court power to stay actions that impose exces-
sive burdens on the estate. Such a reading would allow the majority 
of governmental enforcement actions to proceed under the enforce-
ment exceptions because they satisfy the "reasons of policy or prac-
ticality" under which those exceptions were enacted. 
Congress intended to provide governments with sufficient enforce-
ment powers to protect public health and safety and to prevent 
debtors from using bankruptcy's automatic stay protection as a "ha-
ven" from the law. l09 In addition, however, Congress sought to pro-
104 SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 51; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 342. 
105 A party seeking relief under § 105 must file a separate action with the court, and bears 
a heavy burden of persuasion to overcome the state interest asserted. See In re Territo, No. 
83-0416, slip op. at 5 (Bankr. D. N.J. Sept. 26, 1984). 
106 These factors are discussed supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
107 Because the trustee, or debtor-in-possession, would bring this action, irreparable injury 
could be asserted on behalf of the estate and on behalf of creditors interested in the estate. 
11 U.S.C. § 323(b) (1982). 
lOB See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
109 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 342. 
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tect debtors and their creditors from governmental enforcement 
power when the exercise of such power results in preferential debt 
collection, or when the considerations of fairness to creditors out-
weigh the benefits to the government and to the public from the 
continued enforcement. Preferential debt collection is halted by the 
automatic stay of enforcement of money damages in sections 
362(a)(2) and (b)(5); the more complex balancing of benefits and 
burdens in the case of judgments that are not mere debt collection 
is accomplished through the preliminary injunction available in sec-
tion 105. 
The automatic stay thus was not intended to halt the large class 
of government enforcement proceedings that lie outside the scope of 
"enforcement of money damages." The language of the automatic 
stay exceptions, read in light of their legislative history and against 
the background of the injunctive powers granted to the bankruptcy 
courts under section 105, reveals that governmental authority to 
protect the health and safety of its citizens through enforcement 
proceedings, including costly injunctions when necessary, overrides 
the automatic stay provision activated upon a bankruptcy filing. 
Persuading a court to allow an enforcement action to proceed 
under the exceptions to the automatic stay provision is, however, 
only the first obstacle the government must overcome. In the case 
of a Chapter 7 debtor, the government must also persuade the court 
that the judgment it has received against the debtor, to comply with 
or satisfy certain obligations, is not a judgment obligation that is 
dischargeable by the debtor. Governments have argued that the kind 
of obligation that should be enforceable within the automatic stay 
exceptions, namely, the injunction that requires debtor forbearance 
or action, also should not be an obligation that the debtor can escape 
through its discharge. To aid in understanding this argument, the 
following section of this article discusses the liquidation discharge 
provision of the Act,l1O and its related exceptions. 111 It then discusses 
the definition of "claim"112 in the code that is the basis of an argument 
against the discharge of an injunction. 
B. The Discharge Provision 
The discharge or forgiveness of indebtedness granted to a debtor 
upon completion of a liquidation frees the debtor from some of the 
110 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982). 
III Id. § 523. 
112Id. § lO1(4)(B). 
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debts incurred prior to the bankruptcy petition. 113 In a liquidation, 114 
the debtor's trustee liquidates all non-exempt assets;115 then satisfies 
as many of the debts as possible according to the priority scheme 
set forth in the Act. 116 Remaining debts are discharged unless they 
are exempted from discharge. 117 The discharge provision of the Act 
voids any judgment that had determined the debtor's personal lia-
bility for a debt unless exempt or satisfied in liquidation. 118 This 
provision also protects the debtor from any further actions to collect 
those debts. 119 
The bankruptcy code as a whole is the mechanism by which honest 
debtors, weighed down by financial obligations, may be unburdened 
of past debts and start fresh.120 Congress considered discharge the 
"heart of the fresh start provisions" of the Act. 121 The discharge 
section allows any party in interest to challenge discharge. 122 Parties 
such as the government who challenge the discharge of a particular 
debt may claim that, either the debtor is ineligible for discharge 
because of his post-filing behavior, or that the debt itself is not the 
kind of obligation Congress intended to forgive. Congress requires 
a court to grant a discharge in a liquidation unless the debtor is 
ineligible as defined in the discharge provision. 123 The presumption 
in the law has been to broadly construe the discharge available to 
debtors in order to achieve its primary purpose of giving debtors a 
new life. 124 
Discharge is only available to individuals. 125 Individuals who have 
obstructed the administration of the bankruptcy proceeding through 
113Id. § 727. Discharge forgives only pre-petition debt. 
114 Reorganization under the Code also provides for a discharge of debts. In reorganization, 
debts are restructured to create a new set of obligations under a reorganization plan. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1121-Z3. Therefore, discharge of old debts is contingent on assumption of new, and 
usually much reduced, obligations. See Environmental Protection, supra note 55, at 673-75. 
115 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), (d) (1982). See supra note 49. 
116 [d. § 726. See supra at notes 59-65 and accompanying text. 
117 [d. § 523. 
118 [d. § 524(a)(I). 
119 [d. § 524(a)(3). 
120 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
121 SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 7, reprinted at 5793. 
122 11 U.S.C. § 727(c) (1982). 
123 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 384-85; SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 7, 
reprinted at 5793. See supra note 53. 
124 To reach this result, courts narrowly construe the exemptions to bankruptcy in favor of 
the debtor and against the creditor. See In re Wade, 43 Bankr. 976, 981-82 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1984). 
125 See supra note 53. 
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misfeasance126 or fraud,127 who have failed to supply information to 
the court or trustee,128 or who have been granted a discharge in any 
bankruptcy proceeding in the six years prior to filing will be denied 
a discharge. 129 
The Code also statutorily exempts certain debts from discharge. 130 
Debts not discharged131 include debts resulting from credit obtained 
under falsehoods,132 from certain criminal activities,133 from willful 
and malicious injury, 134 and a debt that is a "fine, penalty or forfeiture 
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not 
compensation for actual pecuniary loss. "135 
The obligation of a debtor to fulfill the terms of an injunction does 
not readily fit into any of the exemption categories. The injunction 
is most similar to the exempted fines, penalties or forfeitures because 
it is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss. An injunction, how-
ever, is imposed to correct legal infractions rather than to punish 
them, and thus in an alternative to fines, penalties and forfeitures. 
Therefore, the injunction is not readily classifiable as one of the 
exempted governmental exactions. 
There is an alternative available to governments challenging the 
discharge of an obligation owed to them by a debtor in bankruptcy. 
They can claim that the obligation cannot be discharged because it 
is not a debt, since the Code refers only to debts. 136 The Code defines 
"debt" as "liability on a claim. "137 The term claim is defined as: 
(A) right to a payment ... (B) right to an equitable remedy for 
breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to 
payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is 
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured. 138 
126 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2) and (3) (1982). 
127Id. § 727(a)(4). 
128 I d. § 727(a)(5)-(7). 
129Id. §§ 727(a)(8) and (9). 
130Id. § 727(b). 
131 Exemptions from discharge are listed in a separate provision since they apply to all 
claims for discharge whether in liquidation or reorganization proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 
(1982). 
132 I d. § 523(a)(2). 
133Id. § 523(a)(4). 
134 I d. § 523(a)(6). 
135 I d. § 523(a)(7). 
136 Id. §§ 524, 727. 
137Id. § 101(11). 
138Id. §§ 101(4)(A) and (B). 
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It is under the second definitional category that governments have 
challenged the inclusion of mandatory injunctive judgments within 
the class of claims subject to discharge. 139 
The legislative history of this definition of "claim" gives support 
to the contention that performance-related injunctive remedies were 
not among those claims Congress intended to include in the definition 
of debts subject to discharge. A very broad definition of claim, 
encompassing "all legal obligations of the debtor" that was in original 
drafts of the Code did not survive to the final bill. 140 The bill as 
enacted contemplates a limitation in the definition of claims related 
to equitable remedies, such as injunctions. As explained by the bill's 
managers in the final floor statements prior to passage: 
Section lOl(4)(B) [the definition of "claim"] represents a modifi-
cation of the House-passed bill to include [in] the definition of 
"claim" a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance 
if such breach gives rise to a right to payment. This is intended 
to cause the liquidation or estimation of contingent rights of 
payment for which there may be an alternative equitable remedy 
with the result that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to 
being discharged in bankruptcy .... On the other hand, rights 
to an equitable remedy for a breach of performance with respect 
to which such breach does not give rise to a right to payment 
are not "claims" and would therefore not be susceptible to dis-
charge in bankruptcy. 141 
Thus, Congress narrowed the original conception of claims as "all 
legal obligations" to exclude equitable remedies that were not re-
duceable to a right to payment so that those claims would be exempt 
from discharge. 
This legislative history and the statutory language suggest that 
some rights to equitable remedies constitute dischargeable claims 
while others do not. Equitable remedies and their discharged duty 
might be differentiated in two ways according to this language. 
First, rights to equitable remedies that arise from a breach of per-
formance (dischargeable) are separable from those that arise from 
139 See generally Brief of Petitioner at 10--35, Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985) [here-
inafter cited as Brief of Petitioner); see also infra notes 210-68 and accompanying text. 
140 The legislative reports discussed the original definition of claim, and concluded by noting 
that "the bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or 
contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest 
possible relief in the bankruptcy court." See SENATE REPORT, supra note 45, at 22, reprinted 
at 5808. 
141 FLOOR STATEMENTS, supra note 92 (emphasis added). 
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another source (non-dischargeable).142 Second, rights to equitable 
remedies arising from a breach of performance would be separable 
into those that create an alternate right to payment (dischargeable) 
and those that do not (non-dischargeable). 143 
The statute and legislative history are silent with regard to 
whether injunctive remedies are distinguished because they do or 
do not arise from a "breach of performance." There is no suggestion 
as to what other source could exist to give rise to rights to such 
equitable remedies. However, the legislative history provides some 
guidance on what might create a "right to payment." In the floor 
statements, the bill managers provide an illustration: 
For example, in some states, a judgment for specific performance 
may be satisfied by an alternative right to payment, in the event 
that performance is refused; in that event, the creditor entitled 
to performance would have a claim for purposes of a proceeding 
under Title 11144 
This example suggests that such judgments would only achieve claim 
status in those states where alternative right to payment is statu-
torily allowed. One interpretation of this language is that unless 
state or federal law specifically provides for an alternative right to 
payment in the case of a right to an equitable remedy, that right is 
not a claim under the statutory definition. 
Applying this rationale to other equitable remedies, such as in-
junctions, to force compliance with state and federal laws leads to 
the conclusion that such remedies ought to be outside the definition 
of claim since failure to comply generally does not give rise to an 
alternate right of payment. Rather, such failure gives rise to a suit 
for either contempt or for the alternative equitable remedy of a 
receivership to force compliance with the terms of the injunction. 145 
The earlier discussion of the automatic stay is informative at this 
point.146 The stay and discharge provisions are the two chief debtor 
relief provisions in the Code. One can argue that, just as the debtor 
enjoys an automatic protection under the stay from enforcement of 
142 For a discussion of one formulation of this argument by the State of Ohio in Ohio v. 
Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985), see infra notes 227--35 and accompanying text. 
143 See infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text. 
144 FLOOR STATEMENTS, supra note 92, at 6437. Specific performance is an equitable remedy 
available to compel the performance of the terms of a contract when payment of damages for 
breach of contract will not provide satisfaction, usually because of the unique nature of the 
contractual obligation. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.2 (1984). 
145 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
146 See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text. 
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governmental money judgments, there is similarly a discharge of 
equitable remedies that reduce to a "right to payment." Conversely, 
the debtor enjoys no automatic protection from enforcement of gov-
ernmental injunctions, and similarly should not be granted a dis-
charge of those injunctions since they are not equitable remedies for 
which a right to payment arises. 
Therefore, the definition of claim in the Bankruptcy Act permits 
a conclusion that mandatory cleanup injunctions and some other 
equitable remedies do not fit within the restricted definition of claim 
and therefore are to be seen as outside the scope of discharge. In 
light of this interpretation, such injunctions would be a continuing 
obligation enforceable against a debtor's post-discharge earnings. 147 
The language and legislative history of the discharge provision 
unfortunately provide insufficient guidance for a court asked to 
choose between the conflicting goals of discharge relief and enforce-
ment of regulatory laws. Discharge is intended to permit the debtor 
to start fresh, unburdened by past debts. The exemptions from 
discharge are strictly construed so as to be most favorable to the 
debtor, so that even when parties have violated civil laws such as 
those protecting the environment, the resulting judgments are not 
specifically exempted from discharge unless those judgments impose 
fines, penalties or forfeitures that are not compensation for pecuniary 
loss. Yet the discharge conditions and exemptions provided in the 
statute support a conclusion that certain pre- and post-petition ac-
tivity, specifically fraud and violations of criminal law, should not be 
condoned by giving the debtor a discharge even when a monetary 
obligation results. Congress did not want law violators to use bank-
ruptcy as a haven from the consequences of illegal activities. To 
extend this policy to injunctions, particularly environmental enforce-
ment injunctions that protect public health would be to recognize 
that the governmental injunction serves a special function protective 
of the public interest. To permit these injunctions to survive bank-
147 In her concurring opinion in Kovacs, discussed infra notes 210-68 and accompanying 
text, Justice O'Connor suggests that attempting to exempt injunctions and related obligations 
from discharge by saying they are not claims would actually prejudice states in the case of 
the bankruptcy of a corporation under Chapter 7. When a corporation goes into bankruptcy, 
all of its assets become part of the estate, and after distribution of the assets the corporation 
dissolves, leaving no post-bankruptcy earnings from which to collect the obligations. See 
Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It may be possible, however, to recover 
from such corporations without a claim by "piercing the corporate veil," which entails a court 
holding corporate board members personally liable, and applying their assets to the continuing 
obligation. See Plumbers & Fitters Local 761 v. Matt J. Zaich Const. Co., 418 F.2d 1054, 1058 
(9th Cir. 1969). 
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ruptcy by determining them to be outside of, rather than exempt 
from, discharge would enable states and the federal government to 
ensure that all responsible parties took part in the clean up of en-
vironmentally threatening conditions. 
III. LITIGATING THE CONTROVERSY: ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT VERSUS BANKRUPTCY RELIEF 
As the foregoing discussion of the Bankruptcy Act illustrates, 
Congress intended that a debtor should be relieved of "the financial 
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy,"148 both through the im-
mediate mechanism of the automatic stay, and through the ultimate 
relief of the discharge of debts. However, Congress also provided 
that the relief given to a debtor through these provisions should 
neither hinder nor provide an escape from governmental enforce-
ment of police and regulatory laws protecting health and safety. 
Courts grapple with the meaning and scope of the provisions of the 
Code that address these concerns because governments enforce their 
environmental laws through the use of mandatory injunctions. 
Courts are attempting to resolve whether judgments that require 
debtors to spend money are money judgments within the meaning 
of the automatic stay provision,149 and whether such judgments are 
dischargeable debts within the discharge provision. 150 
The following sections discuss the conclusions that courts have 
reached concerning the enforcement of injunctive remedies against 
parties in bankruptcy. The first section discusses courts' interpre-
tation of the automatic stay provision and its exceptions. The second 
section discusses the United States Supreme Court's recent decision 
interpreting discharge following liquidation. 
A. Application of the Automatic Stay to Environmental 
Enforcement: When is an Injunction Not An Injunction? 
Cases interpreting the application of the automatic stay provision 
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978151 to environmental enforcement ac-
148 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 340, reprinted at 6297. 
149 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), (b)(5) (1982). 
150 Id. §§ 101(4) and (11). 
151 This article examines only cases decided under the new Bankruptcy Act. See In re 
Johnson, 8 Bankr. 371, 373 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (scope of debtor protection cannot be 
determined by reliance on cases decided under prior bankruptcy law). 
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tions concern attempts to enforce environmental injunctions. 152 The 
governments' argument is that the automatic stay exceptions allow 
them to enforce such injunctions. Debtors and their trustees chal-
lenge the enforcement of the injunctive remedy on the grounds that 
such a remedy actually constitutes a money judgment that, under 
the limitation placed on the § 362(b)(5) exception to the stay, may 
not be enforced against a debtor. 
Two courts of appeal have taken opposite positions on the issue of 
whether an injunction may be enforced against a debtor who claims 
the protection of the automatic stay. The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided in In re Kovacs153(Kovacs I) that a state action to 
enforce an environmental injunction was enforcement not of an in-
junction but of "in essence ... a money judgment," and thus an 
action not excepted from the automatic stay. 154 
In 1976, the State of Ohio brought suit against William Lee Kovacs 
for his connection with the disposal of hazardous chemicals at the 
Chern-Dyne site in Hamilton, Ohio.155 Kovacs was charged with, 
among other things, dumping on the site large quantities of pesti-
cides that were leaking into a nearby river causing fish kills and 
other natural resource damage, and threatening public water sup-
152 A related issue that often gives rise to litigation is whether state and federal government 
units may pursue actions seeking the entry of judgments, including mandatory injunctions, 
pursuant to environmental statutes. These cases involve interpretation of section 362(b)(4), 
which permits state actions seeking entry of a judgment to proceed as an exception to the 
section 362(a)(1) stay of all proceedings. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
Several courts have addressed this issue. In Illinois v. Electrical Utilities, 41 Bankr. 874 
(N.D. Ill. 1984), and Department of Envtl. Resources v. Pegg's Run Coal, 423 A.2d 765 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1980), the courts resolved the issue in favor of the states. The courts found the 
statutory language unambiguous in exempting actions seeking entry of judgments from the 
automatic stay. However, in United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 
20,310 (ENVTL. L. INST.) (D. N.H. Nov. 15, 1982), the district court found that, because of 
the automatic stay of bankruptcy, it did not have jurisdiction to hear an action by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency seeking a mandatory clean-up injunction under CERCLA. 
See CAVEAT CREDITOR, supra note 60, at 10182-83; see also Comment, Bankruptcy and 
Environmental Regulation: An Emerging Conflict, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10099 (ENVTL. L. 
INsT.) (1983). 
153 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983) (Kovacs n. 
The Kovacs I decision was vacated and remanded to the Sixth Circuit to consider the question 
of mootness. At that time, an appeal was pending in the Sixth Circuit from a lower court 
decision regarding Kovacs' discharge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that decision and the state 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), 
cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984) (Kovacs II). The case was decided 
on January 9, 1985. Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985). For a discussion of Kovacs, see 
infra notes 210-68 and accompanying text. 
154 681 F.2d at 456. 
155 Kovacs was sued individually and in his capacity as officer of several defendant corpo-
rations. Id. at 454. 
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plies. 156 Three years later, after negotiations with the state officials, 
Kovacs signed a stipulation, and judgment was entered against him, 
enjoining him from causing any further pollution: He was ordered 
under a mandatory injunction to remove hazardous wastes from the 
premises, and to pay $75,000 to the state as compensation for natural 
resource damage. 157 Kovacs failed to comply with the judgment158 
and in fact brought additional wastes onto the site. 159 In February 
of 1980, a state court granted the state's motion for the appointment 
of a receiver to collect Kovacs' non-exempt assets and apply them 
to the cleanup order. 160 The state court found that Kovacs had acted 
"in flagrant disregard of the Stipulation and Judgment Decree" and 
ordered Kovacs to cooperate fully with the receiver. 161 
In July of 1980, Kovacs filed a personal petition for bankruptcy. 162 
In September, the state moved for a hearing to determine Kovacs' 
current employment status and income to assure that there would 
be adequate funding to effectuate the cleanup ordered by the 
court. 163 Kovacs moved to restrain this action, asserting the protec-
tion of the automatic stay. 
In In re Kovacs, 164 the Sixth Circuit affirmed both the bankruptcy 
court and the district court's decisions165 that the state's action was 
subject to the automatic stay provision of the Code. In its brief per 
curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit held that the state's action against 
Kovacs should be stayed because it was "no different in substance 
from" the enforcement of a money judgment,166 which, under the 
section 362(b)(5) exception to the automatic stay, is not excepted, 
even when sought by a governmental police or regulatory unit. 167 
The court adopted the bankruptcy court's approach, which focused 
on the mechanism used by the state (a hearing to determine wages) 
rather than on the underlying judgment being enforced (mandatory 
injunction) to determine whether the enforcement action should be 
156 Kovacs allegedly participated in the dumping of large quantities of three carcinogenic 
pesticides. These substances were leaking into the Great Miami River and its tributary. Brief 
for the United States, supra note 12, at 2-3. 
157 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 138, at 5. 
158 Id. at 6. 
159 Brief for the United States, supra note 12, at 3. 
160 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 138, at 6. 
161 681 F.2d at 455. 
162 I d. at 455. 
163 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 138, at 4. 
164 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982). 
165Id. 
166Id. at 456 (quoting In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 660 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1981». 
167Id. 
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stayed. 168 The Sixth Circuit, admitting that the Bankruptcy Act 
"indicates a clear intent to permit governmental units to continue to 
enforce their police power through mandatory injunctions,"169 never-
theless found that the state's enforcement proceeding, because it 
was "collect[ing] money," sought what "in essence amounted to a 
money judgment against Kovacs, which was properly subject to the 
automatic stay. "170 
The Sixth Circuit in Kovacs I considered the state's action equiv-
alent to a creditor's action to gain preferential treatment for its debt, 
and concluded that such an action undermines the essential debtor 
protections of the Act.171 Thus the Kovacs I court ignored the in-
junctive "form" of the state's enforcement action in applying the stay 
provision to the government's suit. Instead, it concluded that the 
true "substance" of that claim was a money judgment because money 
was being collected.172 
This reasoning is subject to criticism because by equating the 
state's injunction with a "money judgment," the court ignored the 
language of the bankruptcy statute and its legislative history, and 
contradicted its own assertion that mandatory injunctions were in-
tended to be enforced. The court thus actually elevated the monetary 
"form" of the collection over the injunctive and remedial "substance" 
of the judgment. 
The Third Circuit in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environ-
mental Resources173 rejected the reasoning of the Kovacs I decision, 
on the grounds that the broad interpretation of the term "money 
judgment" in that decision was unsupported by either the language 
or the intent of the Bankruptcy Act. The facts of the Penn Terra 
case are similar to those of Kovacs I. In November of 1981, Penn 
Terra Ltd., the operator of coal surface mines in Pennsylvania, 
entered into a consent order resulting from its admitted violation of 
Pennsylvania environmental laws in connection with its mining ac-
tivities. 174 In the order, Penn Terra agreed to perform immediate 
reclamation work on the mines and to submit and implement a total 
reclamation plan, all within a fixed schedule. 175 Penn Terra failed to 
168 See id. at 455-56. 
169 I d. at 456. 
17°Id. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. 
173 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). 
174 Id. at 269. 
175Id. at 269-70 n.2. 
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comply with that schedule, and in March of 1982, filed a Chapter 7 
petition for bankruptcy. 176 
Several weeks later, the Pennsylvania State Department of En-
vironmental Resources(DER), unaware of the bankruptcy filing, 
brought an action in equity in a Pennsylvania state court seeking a 
preliminary injunction against Penn Terra and its president to cor-
rect the violations and to enforce the terms of the consent order. 177 
In late May, DER obtained an order in the state court for injunctive 
relief against Penn Terra; the order required Penn Terra to perform 
studies within 15 days and make improvements at the mines within 
6 months. 178 Penn Terra responded by filing a petition for contempt 
in the bankruptcy court against DER's attorneys.179 In In re Penn 
Terra Ltd., 180 the bankruptcy court fined the DER attorneys and 
enjoined DER from enforcing the May order from the state court. 181 
The bankruptcy court explicitly relied upon Kovacs J182 in concluding 
that the "mandatory injunction sought by DER requiring the debt-
or's expenditure of funds is in essence the attempted enforcement 
of a money judgment. "183 The district court affirmed. 184 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. In resolving the contro-
versy presented in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental 
Resources,185 the Third Circuit carefully considered the full scope of 
the legal proceeding against a debtor under the protection of the 
automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Act. The court recog-
nized that the stay exceptions "return to the States with one hand 
some of what they had taken away with the other. "186 It concluded 
that the issues before it were whether the DER's actions came within 
the police or regulatory power of the state, and, if so, whether DE R' s 
actions were an attempt to enforce a money judgment. 
Prior to addressing these factual issues, the court discussed the 
principles of statutory construction that governed its interpretation 
176 Id. at 269-70. 
177 I d. at 270. 
178Id. at 270 and n.3. 
179 I d. at 270. 
180 24 Bankr. 427 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982). 
181 Id. at 435. 
182 In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982); see supra notes 153-72 and accompanying 
text. 
183 In re Penn Terra Ltd., 24 Bankr. at 433. 
184 Unreported decision; affirmance is reported in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. 
Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1984). 
185 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). 
186 I d. at 272. 
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of the intersection of the federal law of bankruptcy and the state 
environmental protection laws. The Third Circuit addressed Penn 
Terra's argument that the federal bankruptcy law displaced or 
"preempted" the state's enforcement action. 187 The court concluded, 
however, that because the law does not favor such displacement, the 
federal restoration of state enforcement power through the excep-
tions to the automatic stay should be broadly construed to allow 
enforcement. 188 By contrast, the section 362(b)(5) limit on the en-
forcement of money judgments, which constricts state enforcement 
power, should be narrowly construed. 189 The court supported its 
conclusion that the automatic stay exceptions restore broad power 
to state governments by referring to section 105 of the Code. 190 That 
provision permits courts to stay actions in those situations when "the 
exercise of state power, even for the protection of the public health 
and safety, may run so contrary to the policy of the Bankruptcy 
Code that it should not be permitted. "191 The court found that be-
cause section 105 and not the automatic stay is the proper mechanism 
for enjoining government enforcement actions in such circumstances, 
the court may exercise "latitude in favor of state regulatory powers" 
when, as in this case, it is interpreting the applicability of the au-
tomatic stay provision to an exercise of that regulatory enforcement 
power. 192 
In analyzing the issues before it, the Third Circuit first concluded 
that the state's action for injunctive relief was one to enforce police 
and regulatory power.193 It then proceeded to analyze the definition 
187 [d. at 272-74. Pre-emption is a doctrine that derives from the supremacy clause of the 
United States Constitution, which states that "[t]his Constitution and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land 
.... " U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In a pre-emption analysis, a state law that conflicts with a 
federal statute, either by making it impossible to enforce both laws or by standing as an 
obstacle to executing the full purposes of Congress, will be found void. Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U.S. 725, 747 (1981). The pre-emption doctrine also arises when federal regulation of a 
field is so dominant or pervasive that state regulation in the field is assumed to be precluded. 
See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978). 
The clash between the federal bankruptcy law and the state environmental enforcement 
law does not present a classic "pre-emption" question. Typically, pre-emption becomes an 
issue when a state regulates in an area that the federal government has extensively regulated. 
See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 746 (claimed pre-emption of state law taxing 
natural gas by federal Natural Gas Policy Act). 
188 Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 273. The court's approach to statutory construction requires an 
"explicit" statement in the federal law that the state law is overridden "[w]here important 
state law or general equitable principles protect some public interest." [d. 
189 [d. 
100 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982). 
191 733 F.2d at 273. 
192 [d. at 274. 
193 [d. 
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of "enforcement of a money judgment" as used in section 362(b)(5).194 
Since the bankruptcy statute does not specifically define "money 
judgment" the court looked to common usage to see what was meant 
by the term. It found that a money judgment was traditionally a 
court order requiring the defendant to pay a definite and certain 
sum of money to the plaintiff after a verdict for plaintiff. 195 An action 
to enforce that judgment is typically an action by plaintiff to seize 
the defendant's property to sell it, if necessary, to satisfy that judg-
ment. DER's action, the court found, did not fit this form.196 DER's 
original action was an action in equity to compel performance. This 
action could not have resulted, and did not result in the entry of a 
sum certain. Therefore, its enforcement could not be the enforce-
ment of a money judgment. 197 
The court then rejected defendant's claim, accepted by the district 
court, that DER's suit was "in substance" an action to obtain and 
subsequently to enforce a money judgment. 198 The court relied upon 
its own earlier opinion in United States v. Price199 to reject this 
argument. In Price, the Third Circuit had undertaken a lengthy 
examination, in a non-bankruptcy context, of a mandatory injunction 
that required a defendant to pay for studies in anticipation of a 
hazardous waste cleanup. The injunction ordering the payment of 
the money for that study was determined to be clearly distinct from 
money damages. 2oo Specifically, the Third Circuit stated in Price: 
[d]amages are awarded as a form of substitutional redress, they 
are intended to compensate a party for an injury suffered or 
other loss. A request for funds for a diagnostic study of the 
public health threat posed by the continuing contamination and 
its abatement is not, in any sense, a traditionalform of damages. 
The funding of the diagnostic study . . . though it would require 
monetary payments, would be preventative rather than compen-
satory .... 201 
The fact that an injunction may require the payment or expendi-
ture of money does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of equi-
table relief. 
194 Id. at 274-79. 
195 I d. at 275. 
196 Id. 
197Id. 
198 Id. at 275-77. 
199 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). 
200 I d. at 212. 
201Id. 
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The Penn Terra court also criticized the lower court's reliance on 
the Kovacs I decision.202 The Third Circuit found the Kovacs I in-
terpretation of "money judgment" to be unduly broad, and pointed 
out that if all orders requiring the expenditure of money were money 
judgments, then the section 362 exception for enforcement of gov-
ernment judgments would be "narrowed into virtual non-exis-
tence. "203 
In its concluding statement, the Third Circuit stated that the 
bankruptcy court had placed too much weight on the value of pre-
serving the debtor's funds, and instead should have seen that the 
statutory exceptions to the stay provision require the debtor pro-
tection policy of the stay provision in some cases to "yield to higher 
priorities,"204 such as protection of public health and the environ-
ment. To maintain the proper balance between the competing poli-
cies, the court suggested focusing instead on the nature of the in-
juries to be redressed by the challenged remedy, and whether those 
injuries are "traditionally rectified by a money judgment and its 
enforcement."205 It concluded that the remedy sought by DER was 
"neither in form or substance, the type of remedy traditionally as-
sociated with the conventional money judgment . . . . [T]he Com-
monwealth Court's injunction was meant to prevent future harm to, 
and restore, the environment . . . and did not constitute an action 
to enforce a money judgment. "206 
The polar opposite decisions reached by the courts of appeal in 
Penn Terra and Kovacs may be interpreted as the result of courts 
choosing between conflicting policies. The Kovacs court upheld the 
policy of bankruptcy protection, and the Penn Terra court supported 
the state's right to enforce its environmental laws. The Kovacs I 
court's cursory opinion failed to examine the whole context in which 
to construe the stay provision with its exceptions allowing govern-
mental enforcement. Specifically, that court did not consider the 
state policy being forwarded by the action, the nature of the injuries 
being addressed in the remedy sought to be enforced, and finally, 
the fact that section 105, not the automatic stay, is the mechanism 
for staying burdensome state actions that are not money judgments. 
The Kovacs I court therefore also did not go through a full section 
105 analysis,207 with its requisite balancing of interests. Rather, it 
202 733 F.2d at 277. 
203 Id. at 277-78. 
204 Id. at 278. 
205Id. 
206Id. 
207 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text. 
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saw a possible cost to the debtor, labelled it a "money judgment," 
and then concluded that the automatic stay was still in force. 
In contrast, the Penn Terra court proceeded from the more care-
fully supported position that the stay exceptions would not have 
been included in the Bankruptcy Act if Congress had not intended 
to empower governments to continue to protect their citizens by 
regulating public actors who had declared bankruptcy.208 This broad 
reading by the Third Circuit of the power restored to government 
to pursue their enforcement actions is supported by the legislative 
history of the stay exceptions and the clear language of the excep-
tions themselves. The court recognized that such regulation and 
enforcement, if too burdensome on the debtor or the trustee in his 
administration of the estate, was properly halted only under the 
provisions of section 105, which puts a burden on the trustee to 
present evidence and persuade the court that the stay is necessary. 
Section 105 assures that the court undertakes a systematic consid-
eration of the interests involved. As the Penn Terra court realized, 
because section 105 requires the court to consider the interests of 
both the government and the debtor, as well as the public interest, 
it is not the automatic stay, but rather section 105, that is the proper 
mechanism for determining if an enforcement action should be 
stayed. 209 
B. Discharge of the Obligation to Perform an Environmental 
Cleanup Injunction: Ohio v. Kovacs 
As the foregoing discussion of the courts of appeals cases inter-
preting the automatic stay provision suggests,210 conflicts between 
the protections of the Bankruptcy Code and states regulatory au-
208 See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. 
209 Two courts have evaluated requests by debtors for a discretionary stay under § 105 to 
halt state environmental enforcement actions. In In re Thomas Solvent, 44 Bankr. 83 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 1984), the bankruptcy court ordered the stay of a state's attempt to enforce a 
mandatory injunction to clean up improperly stored chemicals. While ostensibly granting the 
stay under section 105 at the debtor's request, the court did not follow the "typical rules for 
the issuance of an injunction," see supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. Instead the 
court analyzed the request under precedents applicable to the automatic stay, an approach 
that failed to put the burden on the debtor to show why the injunction should issue. In re 
Thomas Solvent, 44 Bankr. at 85-87. 
The court in In re Territo, No. 83-06072, slip op. (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984) held that neither 
the automatic stay, nor a stay under section 105, would halt the State of Ohio's suit to protect 
the state's environment from improper oil and gas production processes. Id. at 4. The court 
noted in its brief section 105 analysis that the debtor had failed to make the requisite showing 
for issuance of an injunction, which the court said was a two-fold showing of (1) irreparable 
injury and (2) likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 5. 
210 See supra notes 151-209 and accompanying text. 
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thority present a potentially irreconcilable clash of policies. In the 
more particular intersection of the automatic stay and its exceptions 
with an injunction imposed by a regulatory authority, the Bank-
ruptcy Code helps to resolve that clash by permitting the court to 
find, as the Third Circuit did in Penn Terra,211 that the regulatory 
goal supersedes the protections of the Bankruptcy Code so that the 
underlying public interest is served. The soundness of the Penn 
Terra approach rests not only in its resolution of statutory ambiguity, 
but in its recognition that when the Bankruptcy Code threatens to 
undercut state regulatory authority, a court must resolve the un-
derlying conflict with sensitivity to, and systematic attention to, the 
state interest involved. The issue of the discharge of an obligation 
to a state that arises from an injunctive judgment presents another 
example of such conflict, resolved in favor of the debtor and the 
protections of bankruptcy by the United States Supreme Court in 
Ohio v. Kovacs.212 
The saga of the State of Ohio's attempt to enforce its injunction 
against William Lee Kovacs did not end with its unsuccessful bid to 
enforce it in spite of the automatic stay. After the state's action to 
discover Kovacs' current income and assets was halted by the stay, 
the state filed a complaint in bankruptcy court seeking a declaration 
that Kovacs' obligation under the state injunction was non-discharge-
able.213 The bankruptcy court held against the state, and ruled that 
Kovacs' obligation to clean up the site was a claim dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.214 Its decision was affirmed by the district court,215 and 
by the Sixth Circuit which, in In re Kovacs216 (Kovacs II), readopted 
its own reasoning from Kovacs 1.217 The Sixth Circuit held that the 
state's judgment was essentially a money judgment, and thus subject 
to discharge like all money judgments of creditors. 218 The State of 
Ohio appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 219 
211 Penn Terra v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). 
212 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985). 
213 Parties seeking to challenge dischargeability are required to file a complaint in the 
bankruptcy court where the bankruptcy petition was filed. FED. BANKR. R. 7001(7). 
214 29 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). 
215 Unpublished opinion, cited in Kovacs, 717 F.2d at 484. 
216 717 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 153-72 and accompanying text. 
217 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 173-206 and accompanying text. 
218 717 F.2d at 787-88. The bankruptcy and district courts below in Kovacs II relied on the 
reasoning in Kovacs I to formulate their opinion that Kovacs' obligation was dischargeable. 
However, after the district court ruled in Kovacs II, the Court reversed and remanded the 
Sixth Circuit's ruling in Kovacs I. 103 S. Ct. 810 (1983). Therefore, the Sixth Circuit in Kovacs 
II could not rely, as had the bankruptcy and district courts, on the "law of the case." In re 
Kovacs, 717 F.2d at 987. The Sixth Circuit asserted that its affirmation of the lower court's 
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In Ohio v. Kovacs,220 Kovacs argued that his obligation to remove 
toxic waste from the Chern-Dyne site was dischargeable because it 
fell within the statutory definition of both debt and claim, and there-
fore was not specifically exempted by the exemption provision221 of 
the Bankruptcy Act. 222 He claimed that the state court's order was 
a mere "contract" with the state to do certain things and to pay 
money in return for his release from liability.223 Furthermore, Ko-
vacs asserted that the state's choice to appoint a receiver was "ex-
tremely significant."224 Since the receiver took over all Kovacs's 
assets and applied them to the cost of clean up, the state court's 
order no longer commanded performance of an act, but had become 
instead a dischargeable obligation to pay money.225 Kovacs also ar-
gued that the discharge of his debt to the state did not impair the 
state's ability to enforce its environmental laws. In fact, he claimed, 
this case involved no issue of environmental law, but instead involved 
the "much more basic human issue" of whether he should receive 
the "fresh start" provided by the Bankruptcy Act in its discharge 
provision. 226 
Throughout its battle to have Kovacs' obligation under the injunc-
tion declared non-dischargeable, the state eschewed any argument 
that the obligation fit into any of the categories of debts that were 
statutorily exempt from discharge. 227 Instead, the state argued that 
the debtor's obligation to the state arose from a violation of law, and 
therefore is distinct from the kind of private financial obligation for 
which the bankruptcy law provides relief when that obligation is not 
a money judgment but instead is a continuing obligation. 228 To relieve 
the debtor of such obligations, the state argued, would effectively 
preclude the state from using injunctive remedies to achieve envi-
decisions to discharge the obligation to the state was "for a different reason" than its own 
prior reasoning in Kovacs I. Id. However, the court expressly readopted its prior reasoning 
that the payments to the receiver sought by the state was a "money judgment equivalent" 
and thus subject to discharge. Id. at 988. 
219 Cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs, 104 S. Ct. 1438 (1984). 
220 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985). 
22111 U.S.C. § 523 (1982). See supra text and notes at notes 131-35. 
= Brief of Respondent at 7-12, Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 
Brief of Respondent]. 
223 Id. at 8. 
224 Id. at 9. 
225Id. 
226 I d. at 13. 
227 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 139. 
228 I d. at 8, 20-23. 
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ronmental and related public safety objectives. 229 Specifically, the 
state argued that the obligation imposed on Kovacs by the state 
court was not within the Code's section 101(4) definition of claim 
because the obligation arose from a violation of law, not a contractual 
"breach of performance. "230 Additionally, Kovacs' failure to fulfill his 
obligation did not give rise to an alternative right to payment as 
required by the statute and thus was not a dischargeable "claim. "231 
In support of its contention that the judgment against Kovacs did 
not arise from a breach of performance, the state distinguished 
between the obligation owed by Kovacs to the state and its citizens 
because of his violation of environmental laws, and the kind of pri-
vate contractual obligation to which the statute and legislative his-
tory referred in its definition of "claim. "232 A "breach of perfor-
mance," the state argued, could only arise from the failure to fulfill 
a contractual obligation, not from the failure of a party to fulfill his 
statutory duty under a court order.233 The state pointed out that the 
consent decree, entered into by Kovacs and chosen by the state 
because it could then more quickly and more effectively clean up the 
site, arose as an alternative to criminal sanctions that a court could 
have imposed on Kovacs because of his violation of Ohio law.234 When 
Kovacs failed to comply with the consent decree, which gave rise to 
the mandatory injunction and the receivership, those judgments 
were still based on the violation of law, not on a "breach of perfor-
mance. "235 
The state then argued that the legislative history of the definition 
of "claim" made clear that those obligations were not money damages 
or their equivalent, because they cannot be reduced to a sum certain, 
229Id. at 10, 43. 
23°Id. at 8, 14-31. See supra text and notes at notes 140-47. 
231 Id. at 9, 31-37. 
232 Id. at 11-19, 22-23. 
233 I d. at 19-20. 
234 I d. at 23-24. 
235 Id. at 24-26. In support of this position, the State argued that the obligation owed to it 
by Kovacs was akin to restitution, for which federal courts have carved out an exception to 
discharge despite the fact that restitution payments are not statutorily exempted in section 
523 of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1982), Brief of Petitioner, supra note 139, at 23 (citing 
United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Cox, 33 Bankr. 657 (Bankr. M.D. 
Ga. 1983». 
In its brief, the United States also argued the analogy between Kovacs' debt and restitution. 
The Solicitor General pointed out that, in carving out this exception for restitution payments, 
the courts looked to the purpose of the obligation owed (rehabilitation) rather than to the 
form that obligation took (money payments) and thus followed the approach that the Penn 
Terra court had taken in evaluating an obligation similar to Kovacs'. See Brief for the United 
States, supra note 12, at 22-23. 
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and do not give rise to an alternative right of payment. 236 Therefore, 
such obligations are non-dischargeable because they are not 
claims. 237 The state cited the legislative history, and pointed out that 
the final, more limited definition of claim adopted by Congress in-
cluded only obligations giving rise to such alternate right of pay-
ment. 238 In particular, the state argued that its receivership was not, 
as Kovacs argued,239 an alternative to the payment of Kovacs's ob-
ligation. Rather, it was an effectuation of that obligation because the 
money collected by the receivership was not to compensate the state 
for payments made to clean up, but to apply to the cleanup effort. 240 
As the state explained in its brief to the Court: 
The reality of the situation is that there is no alternative to 
performance of the injunction to abate the peril to the people of 
Hamilton. Kovacs can make no payment to anyone and thereby 
leave the continuing threat to the citizens of Ohio unabated. 
Rather, any expenditure by Kovacs goes to the receivership to 
assist in the cleanup.241 
Last, the state argued that the decision below would enable a 
bankruptcy court to excuse violators of the law from their continuing 
obligations, and thus "effectively destroy"242 the states' ability to 
protect citizens through injunctive actions against such offenders. 
Such a decision, the state argued, runs counter to two policies in 
the bankruptcy code itself. The first, vindicated by the Third Circuit 
in Penn Terra,243 is to preserve the ability of states and other gov-
ernmental units to use and enforce equitable remedies against debt-
ors in order to protect their citizens from future harm. 244 The second 
closely related policy is to preserve the bankruptcy system as a 
shelter from financial overextension by honest debtors but to prevent 
it from becoming a haven for wrongdoers. 245 
The Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs246 rejected the state's ar-
guments and unanimously affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit 
236 Brief of the Petitioner, supra note 139, at 31. 
237 See, e.g., 11 u.s.c. § 101(4)(B) (1982) and supra notes 136--39 and accompanying text. 
238 Brief of the Petitioner, supra note 138, at 13. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying 
text. 
239 Brief of Respondent, supra note 222, at 9. 
240 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 139, at 31-37. 
241 Id. at 37. 
242Id. at 41-44. 
243 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). See supra notes 173-206 and accompanying text. 
244 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 139, at 41-42. 
245 See Brief for the United States, supra note 12, at 7-8, 25; see also Brief of Petitioner, 
supra note 139, at 43. 
246 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985). 
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that had permitted Kovacs to be discharged from his obligation to 
clean up the Chern-Dyne site. The Court first addressed itself to the 
state's arguments that claims relating to debts subject to discharge 
referred only to contractual obligations and not to obligations arising 
from violation of statutes. In dismissing that argument, the Court 
pointed out that no such distinction exists in the Code. 247 The Court 
reasoned that all of Kovacs' obligations to the state bore the same 
character as claims. Since Kovacs' obligation to pay $75,000 in com-
pensation for natural resource damages was clearly a dischargeable 
claim, the Court stated that "it makes little sense to assert that 
because the cleanup order was entered to remedy a statutory vio-
lation, it cannot likewise constitute a claim for bankruptcy pur-
poses. "248 
The Court also disposed of the state's argument that its judgment 
did not give rise to an "alternate right to payment. "249 Finding the 
statutory language and legislative history to be sparse yet unambig-
uous, the Court agreed with the bankruptcy court and the court of 
appeals below that the state had a claim against Kovacs within the 
meaning of section 101(4) of the statute. 250 The Court expressly 
adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals, that concluded Kovacs 
could no longer personally clean up the site, so "the cleanup duty 
had been reduced to a monetary obligation. "251 
The Court saw the appointment of a receiver as determinative. 
Acknowledging that the state may correctly have chosen to put 
Kovacs' assets into receivership to pay for the cleanup, the Court 
concluded: 
[a]s wise as this course may have been, it dispossessed Kovacs, 
removed his authority over the site, and divested him of assets 
that might have been used by him to clean up the property .... 
Although Kovacs had been ordered to "cooperate" with the re-
ceiver, he was disabled by the receivership from personally tak-
ing charge of and carrying out the removal of wastes from the 
property. What the receiver wanted from Kovacs after bank-
ruptcy was the money to defray cleanup costs .... Had Kovacs 
furnished the necessary funds, either before or after bankruptcy, 
there seems little doubt that the receiver and the State would 
have been satisfied. 252 
247 [d. at 708. 
248 [d. at 708-09. 
249 [d. at 709. 
250 [d. at 709-10. 
251 [d. at 710. 
252 [d. at 710-11. 
1986] ENFORCEMENT INJUNCTIONS 435 
Thus, the state's choice to "dispossess" Kovacs, rather than to in-
stitute civil or criminal contempt proceedings against him, meant 
that Kovacs' obligation had been "converted into an obligation to pay 
money, an obligation that was dischargeable in bankruptcy. "253 
This conclusion that the state's judgment against Kovacs had been 
"transformed" into a money judgment echoes the Sixth Circuit's 
automatic stay decision in Kovacs I, and is as inadequate as that 
decision is in articulating why the Court chose to prefer the policy 
of debtor relief over the conflicting policy of regulatory enforcement. 
The Court addressed neither the ambiguity in the Code's definition 
of "claim" as it relates to equitable remedies,254 nor the argument 
that the narrow definition of money judgment in the automatic stay 
provision as formulated by the Penn Terra court might inform the 
limits of the discharge provision. 255 As a result, no credence was 
given to the idea underlying those arguments, namely that the Code 
makes an analytical distinction in its relief provisions between eq-
uitable remedies, which are not stayed and are only sometimes 
discharged, and money judgments, which are never stayed and al-
ways discharged. By accepting the lower court's equation that in 
Kovacs' case, an injunction plus receivership equals a money judg-
ment the Court muddies the distinction from the Code, and perhaps, 
as the Penn Terra court suggests, "narrow[s] it into virtual nonex-
istence. "256 
However, what is more troubling with the Court's analysis is not 
the dissatisfying analytical tack taken, but rather the short shrift 
given to the important policy considerations forwarded by the state 
and its amici in this case. The Court makes no reference to the fact 
that its disposition of this case means a choice between a federal and 
state policy, nor does the Court refer to the fact that in Kovacs' 
case, application of the bankruptcy law has effectively nullified the 
253 [d. at 71I. 
254 The Court briefly discussed the legislative history, and selectively quoted from part of 
the legislative history, compare 105 S. Ct. at 709 with discussion of § 101(4)(B), in FLOOR 
STATEMENTS, supra note 92; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text. This approach 
to the legislative history gives no credence to the argument suggested by the bill's managers 
that the definition of "claim" was intended to exclude some equitable remedies from discharge. 
See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text. 
255 The state forwarded this argument, see Brief of Petitioner, supra note 139, at 10, 41-
44. It was made more forcefully, however, by the Solicitor General in his amicus brief. See 
Brief for the United States, supra note 12, at 8-17. 
The Court acknowledged the Penn Terra case in a footnote, but distinguished it since the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had not appointed a receiver. 105 S. Ct. at 711, n. II. 
256 Penn Terra v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267,278-79 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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enforcement of an important state objective, the protection of public 
health and safety. 
The Court indirectly addressed this issue by being "careful"257 to 
emphasize what it had not decided. Specifically, the Court said that 
the decision to grant a discharge did not prevent the state from 
prosecuting Kovacs for his violation of the environmental laws of 
Ohio,258 or for criminal contempt for his failure to perform under the 
injunction.259 The Court suggested that, had Ohio imposed fines or 
monetary penalties on Kovacs prior to bankruptcy, those fines or 
penalties would be exempt from discharge under the bankruptcy 
statute,260 and, in its most oblique qualification, the Court refused 
to speculate on the result had Kovacs taken bankruptcy before the 
appointment of the receiver. 261 In addition, the Court stated that it 
did not hold that the injunction preventing Kovacs from bringing 
any further wastes on the premises was discharged, but instead 
addressed "only the affirmative duty to clean up the site and the 
duty to pay money to that end. "262 
This caveat to the Court's holding sends a confusing message to 
the states and the federal government regarding the use and en-
forcement of mandatory injunctions to require clean-up under envi-
ronmental regulatory laws. 263 As one commentary has noted, in light 
of the Ohio v. Kovacs language, dischargeability of an obligation 
seems to depend in part on the mechanism the government chooses 
to use in its enforcement. 264 If the government imposes an injunction 
and, in the face of non-compliance, the court issues fines and penal-
ties, either under its contempt power or under the statutory exemp-
tion, such fines and penalties would be enforceable. Such enforce-
257 105 S. Ct. at 711. 
258 Id. 
259Id. 
25°Id. 
261Id. 
262Id. 
263 See In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). 
The confusion also extends to courts attempting to discover the reach of the Kovacs holding, 
and to debtors and potential debtors who face regulatory obligations of all kinds. See Bank-
ruptcy Protection, supra note 53, at 12. 
264 See CAVEAT CREDITOR, supra note 60, at 10174. Drabkin, et al., suggest that under the 
Ohio v. Kovacs language, dischargeability seems also to depend on the debtor's personal 
ability to comply with the terms of a mandatory injunction. Id. One court relied on Ohio v. 
Kovacs in its decision to discharge the obligation of a debtor under a mandatory injunction 
because the debtor, who had filled in marshland, could not restore the marsh "through his 
own labor and without expense to the estate." In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. 136, 139 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1985). 
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ment may, however, be limited to cases where the fines and penalties 
were imposed prior to the bankruptcy petition. The obligation to 
clean up a site might survive as non-dischargeable, so as long as the 
government does not reduce its injunction to a receivership, which, 
even the Court suggests,265 may be the "wisest" and most effective 
way to achieve the purpose of public protection that underlies the 
injunction, or does not clean up itself, thereby creating a monetary 
debt. 266 The Court's decision thus potentially creates a disincentive 
to rapid and effective cleanup actions by governmental units when 
bankrupt parties may be involved because of the uncertainty at-
tending the effect of non-action. The only risk-free option left for 
governments is to pursue environmental violators under the criminal 
laws, to the extent those laws are applicable, since criminal prose-
cutions are not subject to the automatic stay provision,267 and the 
monetary penalties imposed pursuant to them are not dischargeable. 
While the criminal prosecution of environmental violators may be 
appropriate in some instances, it is an unsatisfying way to approach 
the problem of inadequately disposed wastes because it does not 
fulfill the purposes of the civil laws, namely to create a remedy that 
both deters future harm and places the cost of improper disposal on 
the responsible parties. In addition, if by using a criminal, rather 
than a civil remedy, a state may reach post-bankruptcy assets, the 
Court's decision encourages governments to discriminate between 
parties to an action based on their financial status, which is a result 
the Code does not countenance. 268 Thus, in Ohio v. Kovacs the Court 
injected even more uncertainty into the vexing problem of how states 
and the federal government may clean up and deter hazardous waste 
problems. 269 
265 Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 710. 
266 But see In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). 
267 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (Supp. v 1984). 
268 For example, the Code's anti-discrimination provisions forbid governmental units from 
discriminating against current or past debtors in various contexts. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (Supp. V 
1984). 
269 In January of 1986, the Court decided another case in which the Code's relief provisions 
conflicted with environmental enforcement by a state government. In Mid-Atlantic Nat'l Bank 
v. New Jersey, 54 U.S.L.W. 4138 (Jan. 27, 1986), the Court held that a bankruptcy trustee 
could not exercise statutory powers to abandon burdensome property in contravention of a 
state statute designed to protect public health or safety. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Powell, 
relying in part on the example of the automatic stay's governmental exceptions, found that 
Congress did not intend for the Code to preempt all state laws. Id. at 4141. In addition, the 
Court found support for its holding restricting the preemptive power of the Code in repeated 
congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment against toxic pollution." I d. 
While this decision represents an important affirmation of the public health and safety goals 
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CONCLUSION 
Both state and federal environmental laws that address the prob-
lem of cleaning up hazardous wastes rely in part on the mandatory 
injunction as a tool to force rapid clean up and to shift the costs to 
responsible parties. When those parties, facing the obligations under 
such an injunction, seek the shelter of the federal bankruptcy sys-
tem, it is unclear whether the Bankruptcy Code relieves them of the 
legal obligations that arise from their role in the improper disposal 
of wastes. The first level of relief in the Code, the automatic stay 
provision, suggests that such injunctions may be enforced; however, 
two courts of appeals have reached opposite conclusions: one court 
determined that injunctive remedies may be enforced under the 
automatic stay exceptions; another court found that injunctions that 
cost money are unenforceable money jUdgments. The applicability 
of the Code's discharge provision to injunctions is similarly uncer-
tain, since the Court in Ohio v. Kovacs largely confined that case to 
its peculiar set of enforcement facts. The one clear message that 
emerges is that if states and the federal government want to ensure 
that the bankruptcy system will not shield polluters, they must 
decide to treat those polluters like criminals. 
of states and the federal government, its inconsistency with Kovacs is striking. This decision 
again leaves unanswered important questions of conflict between bankruptcy relief and envi-
ronmental protection. 
